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689 BOOK REVIEWS 
On the Battlefield of Merit: Harvard Law School, the First Century. 
By Daniel R. Coquillette and Bruce A. Kimball. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2015. Pp. xi, 666. $39.95.) 
We have long needed a serious history of the Harvard Law School. 
On the Battlefield of Merit is the first of a projected two-volume 
work designed to fill this need. This first volume is an exhaustively 
researched, reader-friendly book that tells much that was not gen-
erally known about the origins and early development of this major 
American institution. Taking advantage of Coquillette’s knowledge of 
colonial and early nineteenth-century history and expanding on Kim-
ball’s of the late nineteenth-century history of universities and his 
work on Langdell, the book paints a rich understanding of the way 
that a once modest, regional law school became the most important 
one in America. 
The story begins with a 1781 bequest that took thirty-five years 
to realize and even then barely provided sufficient income for one 
professor who, being a judge, could only teach part time. A second 
practitioner teacher was paid solely out of tuition, this at a time when 
few law schools existed and almost all lawyers learned their law as ap-
prentices. These first teachers at the school were not very successful; 
indeed, the school nearly failed. However, the next pair of teachers, 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story and practitioner Simon Green-
leaf, attracted in part by a second endowed professorship and a new 
law school building, righted the school and began to build a broader 
profile for it, drawing students from the mid-Atlantic and southern 
states. A third professorship was added after Story died and Green-
leaf retired and the three new faculty members attempted to insulate 
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the school from the growing ructions over slavery, the Civil War, and 
Reconstruction. These years were of stasis rather than decline as had 
previously been thought. Starting in 1869 with the appointment of 
Charles W. Eliot as Harvard’s president and in 1870 with that of 
Christopher Columbus Langdell as dean, the Law School underwent 
a slow but continuous revolution. What had always been a school 
where admission required only that students have a good classical 
education, a law degree could be earned with only twelve to eighteen 
months of residency, classes could be taken in any order, no exams 
were given, and instruction had slowly moved from the text and recita-
tion to lectures punctuated with questions delivered by practicing or 
retired lawyers and judges, After Langdell’s appointment, admission 
required students have a four-year degree from a reputable college, 
three years of residency for a law degree, carefully sequenced classes, 
rigorous exams with expectations of high achievement, and instruc-
tion featuring questions and answers about appellate cases led by 
academic scholars with modest practice experience. Surprisingly, the 
more stringent the program became, the more students from all parts 
of the country came to what had become a national law school. 
As an author whose work on law school histories (“Mirror, Mirror 
on the Wall: Histories of American Law Schools,” Harvard Law Re-
view 95 [1982]) is explicitly acknowledged in telling this remarkable 
story, it is perhaps ungracious of me to object that while Coquillette 
and Kimball do a fine job of paying attention to two of the ab-
sences that my colleague Fred Konefsky and I noticed in law school 
histories—the social life of a law school and the general trends in 
society—their understanding of the third, ideology, leaves a bit to be 
desired. 
An ideology is like the water in which fish swim or the air, birds 
fly; it is the set of ideas that people take for granted as the way their 
world is organized, the residue left over after matters of opinion seem 
to be settled. And so, the call “ideology” often is heard when some 
people wish to assert that the matter is not, or at least should not be, 
settled at all. Often, those who choose to defend the taken-for-granted 
return that call. Historians need to pay attention to the ideologies of 
the past, as well as those of the present (sometimes known by the 
gentler name of “presentism”) that often signal little more than “right 
thinking.” On the Battlefield of Merit has problems with both varieties 
of ideology. Three examples suffice. 
First, the opening of the Harvard Law School was made possible by 
a bequest of Isaac Royall, Jr., the wealthy owner of a sugar plantation 
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on the island of Antigua and of slaves who worked it. Royall lived 
graciously in Massachusetts for about thirty-five years, all the while 
being served by slaves that his father had brought when the family 
fled Antigua in the aftermath of a slave rebellion. Since slavery had 
been held unconstitutional in Massachusetts the year Royall died— 
though still legal in Antigua—it might have been interesting to learn 
what the Harvard Corporation or its Overseers thought of accepting 
property from a slaveholder. Instead, we are told that the members of 
Harvard’s governing bodies who accepted the gift were conservative 
Federalists and Unitarians, that two less tainted individuals who had 
attempted to make a similar bequest had unfortunately been unable 
to do so, and that a slave owner was “hardly the ideal founder of a 
school devoted to the study of law and justice” (p. 75) 
Second, one of the highlights of this book is a taut recounting of 
discord at the Law School before, during, and after the Civil War. 
Northern and southern students fought out their disagreements in a 
forum designed to help them understand legislative procedure. The 
ferocity of their arguments led the school’s three professors to im-
pose a rule forbidding the discussion of slavery, though later two 
of them had spirited public disputes about the constitutionality of 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, his suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus, and Reconstruction. These two professors earlier had 
come to realize that the appointment to the faculty of a well-known 
abolitionist was impossible in 1848. Yet six years later, the university’s 
governing bodies terminated the appointment of a lecturer who was 
unsympathetic to slavery, though not abolitionist, but who as a fed-
eral commissioner ordered the return of a slave under the Fugitive 
Slave Act. And yet, after having detailed this history of the school’s 
situation in the late 1860s, we are reminded that arguments “for 
racial  justice . . . would take more than  a  century to be vindicated” 
(p. 281) 
In these two instances, the authors’ summative comments, which 
could be called presentist, represent an ideology (one I happen to 
share) that unfortunately acts to impede a fuller recognition of the 
troubled and conflicting disputes within the governing bodies of Har-
vard, its faculty, and its students. An understanding of them might 
better explain why, for a century after a bloody, awful war and three 
constitutional amendments, only a modest part of longed-for social 
justice objectives had been achieved. 
My third example is much simpler. In the years following Langdell’s 
appointment as dean, there was a long, low intensity fight over 
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whether professors should be experienced practitioners, such as
Langdell himself, or rather recent graduates who had done well in
law school, which Langdell argued was better. Earlier, I noted how
this fight ended, but what is interesting is how the authors describe it
as a choice between “professional experience” and “academic merit.”
This is a loaded construction; “professional merit” would have been
a fairer presentation of one of the choices. However, setting aside
matters of fairness in debate, the assumption of the proposition that
“merit” is dominated by consideration of an ordinal distribution that
sums exam grades or any other competitive results while perfectly
ordinary in our world, is best understood as deeply ideological, as a
marker of who won an argument. Alternative measures of merit with
respect to potential for teaching are all around us: normal rather than
ordinal distributions, astuteness in practice, degree of suspicion of
the “legal,” which is to say “bureaucratic,” ordering of life (“politics”
in a word), possession of other professional orientations than law,
and even questions of gender, class, race, ethnicity, or religion. Most
possibilities to which the authors regularly call attention are absent
from the list of concerns in Harvard Law School’s first hundred years.
Defining merit may have been the problem, not the solution. 
John Henry Schlegel is UB Distinguished Professor of Law at the
University at Buffalo, State University of New York. He writes on the
history of legal education, jurisprudence, and economic history and
development. 
